

A Time Like This
Korean Church and the Privatization of Religion

*Lee Sung Ock*¹

ABSTRACT

The secularization theory, a prediction of the end of religion as the result of rationalization and scientific progress, is losing its persuasiveness. But the retreat of Christianity from the public sphere, the privatization, is widely observed. In Korea, Christianity became a vehicle of social change toward progress in the beginning, but soon withdrew to the private realm after the severe attack on the Independent Movement in which many Christians participated and the further deterioration through Shintoism, imposed by the colonial regime. This prevented Korean Christianity from building a healthy Christian culture. The problems the Korean Church faces today are all results of the privatization of religion which should be solved on a social level not by individual pietism only.

Introduction

On the March 25, 2001, a ceremonial service was held at the famous Kwangrim Church celebrating the retirement of its senior pastor and the inauguration of its new one. Meanwhile, across the street opposite to the church about one hundred people from different Christian organizations protested in silence the church's hereditary transmission of its leadership. Next day, many daily newspapers dealt with the issue of *seseup*, that is hereditary transmission, in Korean churches,² and a few similar cases in the past were recalled. Churches were criticized for their business-oriented strategy: The mind set of the senior pastor who regards a church as his private property, was pointed out as the reason for such worldly phenomena. The Korean Church was on the chopping board of public opinion.³ The uniform criticism was of the deterioration in morality and spirituality of the Korean Church: the secularization of the Korean Church.

¹ Korean names throughout this paper are written in the order they appear in Korea: a family name (usually one syllable) followed by a given name (usually two syllables).

² Han Yong Sang, *Kyohwoega juguya yesuga sandu* (Should Church die, Jesus Lives), (Seoul: Haenuri, 2001), p. 208.

³ This is a Korean expression used when everyone talks about an issue or a person's fault(s).

However, the relevance of the *seseup* issue is not restricted to the morality of Korean Christianity, but extends to its social and systematic weaknesses. With its waning ability to create and influence culture, the Korean Church has rather become susceptible to the culture of the society it belongs to. Hence, the Korean Christian culture became one which reflected the secularity of Korean culture. This paper will examine the social aspects of Korean Christianity which allowed such a scandalous event as *seseup*. Matters of privatization of religion, the demand for democracy within the Korean Church, and the emergence of a 'born-Christian' generation are all inter-related. The latter two problems can be explained in terms of privatization.

Secularization, Privatization and Feminization in Korean Christianity

For the last three centuries, the idea that rationalization and scientific progress will bring an end to religion was the predominant theory in the social sciences, going as far as predicting dates for the extinction of religion.⁴ This thesis is called 'secularization theory'. Secularization is defined as the process through which, starting from the center and moving outward, successive sectors of society and culture have been freed from the decisive influence of religious ideas and institutions.⁵ However, the prophesied end of religion did not occur and scholars began to re-examine the theory.

While others try to revise secularization theory, Rodney Stark strongly advocates the rejection of the theory in its entirety. His criticism is based on the following: first, that the theory has always nestled within modernization whose assumptions are questionable. Second, while the theory is designed to explain institutional retreat, in research individual piety becomes the unit of analysis. Third, though secularization predicts that the most scientific people will be the least religious, in reality scientists are as religious as anyone else. Fourth, there are counter-evidences to the theory's prediction. And lastly, the discussion of the theory focuses on Christendom and is not uniformly applicable to other religions.⁶ Stark adds that a renowned sociologist of religion Peter Berger has also recanted his belief in secularization which was the mood of the times.⁷ Jose Casanova also notices the discrepant usage of the term 'secularization' which Europeans tend to use to mean religion's loss of

⁴ Rodney Stark, 'Secularization, R.I.P. - rest in peace', *Sociology of Religion*, Fall 1999, www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_moSOR/is_3_60/ai_57533381/print, p.1-19, p. 1.

⁵ Os Guinness, *The Gravedigger File. Papers on the Subversion of the Modern Church*, (Downers Grove, IL: Inter-Varsity Press, 1983), p. 51, quoting Peter Berger, *Social Reality of Religion*, (London: Harmondsworth, 1973), p. 113.

⁶ Stark, 'Secularization', pp. 2-7.

⁷ Stark, 'Secularization', pp.1-2.

social relevance, and Americans to mean the loss of individual belief.⁸ His view on the theory has also undergone a change. He said that Europe was the exception to the rule at a forum at Georgetown University, Washington DC.⁹ In his recent writing, he acknowledged that we have reached an impasse in the secularization debate and need to adopt a more global perspective.¹⁰ Scientific research seems to support the failure of secularization's prediction as Bruce Hood's research shows that 'magical thinking' is hard-wired into our brains. Hood predicts that religion will persist because people's minds will not evolve to become more rational.¹¹ The expression *homo religiosus* which nearly disappeared under the pressure of secularization theory may regain its voice.

As Guinness points out, secularization theory presupposes a religious 'golden age' which he deems an imaginary past.¹² Stark presents historical records from Medieval Europe of the number of pastors and people who attended masses, showing there never was an 'Age of Faith'.¹³ Nevertheless, we cannot deny that Christianity was the established official religion, which wielded strong institutional influence on European society. Thus what scholars have been observing as 'secularization' is not the process leading to the end of religion, but the 'dechristianization' of Europe. By this definition, Korean Christianity, which lacks any historical period of institutionalized Christianity and its consequent influences, cannot undergo secularization. Rather, it was Confucianism, which was the official religion of Korea until the beginning of the twentieth century, that went through a disempowering process with the introduction of modernity accompanied by the introduction of Christianity. *Cheonmins*, the lowest class in Korean society at the time, were moving toward emancipation. Women began to be educated, the movement against concubinage was launched, and early marriage was discouraged. The attitude that looked down on labor started to change. Most importantly, ancestral worship, which is one of the basic axes of Confucianism, was no longer a compulsory ceremony to all Koreans.¹⁴ Confucianism, however, has kept a deeply dominating position in the value system of Koreans including Christians. In contrast to the Western concept, the term secularization in Korea is more literally used to describe a religion whose values are penetrated by and assimilated to worldly (secular) ones.

⁸ Jose Casanova, 'Beyond European and American Exceptionalism: towards a Global Perspective' in Grace Davie, Paul Heelas, and Linda Woodhead (ed.), *Predicting Religion*, (Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire, 2003), pp. 17-29, p.18.

⁹ 'Religion and Public Life: A New Alliance?', www.georgetown.edu.centers/woodstock/report/r-fea65a.htm, p. 8.

¹⁰ Casanova 'Beyond European and American Exceptionalism', pp. 17-27.

¹¹ www.telegraph.co.uk/core/Content/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/09/05/nsnciccc05.xml

¹² Guinness, *The Gravedigger File*, p. 115.

¹³ Stark, 'Secularization', pp. 4-7.

¹⁴ Lee Ik Kwan, *lyagi Hankuk Kyowhoesa* (Stories of Korean Church History), (Gardina, CA: Printron Printing, 2005), pp. 406-412.

In place of secularization theory, privatization theory better explains what is happening to religion in the West and applies to Korean Christianity. Privatization, according to McGuire, is the process by which certain differentiated institutional spheres (e.g. religion, family, leisure, the arts) are segregated from the dominant institutions of the public sphere (e.g. economic, political, legal) and relegated to the private sphere.¹⁵ Peter Berger adds that privatization focuses on the private sphere as the special arena for the expansion of individual freedom and fulfilment.¹⁶ Furthermore, as Robertson explains, by individuation the individual and his/her concerns come to be seen as distinct from the social group and its concerns.¹⁷ The private sphere is an island where the (free and choosing) 'real self' lives as the 'real self' does not live in the 'real [public] world'.¹⁸

But scholars warn that this freedom becomes a captivity since its practice is permitted only in the private sphere and not in the public sphere.¹⁹ As the individual increasingly finds his/her sources of identity in the private sphere, one's identity becomes at stake, resulting in problems of meaning and integration as well as trouble in legitimating oneself.²⁰ Another signal that religion is gradually being pushed away into the private sphere can be found in the tax exemption of Church. The very exemption, according to Richard Garnett, is also means of control by which the voice of the Church is taken away from the public sphere.²¹ Moreover, he asserts that we should not permit the State to tell the Church when it is being 'religious' and when it is not.²² He concludes that the privatization of religion is a one-way 'ratchet that stems the flow of religious current into the public sphere, but does not show the incursion of political norms into the private realm'.²³ Guinness insightfully analyzes the results of privatization as limitation on freedom (as freedom is permitted only in the private sphere), a sense of fragmentation or dislocation (since there is no Christian mind integrating all of life), an inherently unstable private sphere (because choice can be changed any time), and vulnerability to manipulation (as external forces like mass media can easily manipulate).²⁴

Religious wars in Europe which resulted in the loss of Christian unity are often designated as a cause of secularization and privatization of

¹⁵ Meredith B. McGuire, *Religion: The Social Context*, (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1981), p. 243.

¹⁶ Guinness, *The Gravedigger File*, p.74, quoting Peter Berger in Peter Berger, Brigitte Berger and Hansfried Kellner, *The Homeless Mind*, (London: Harmondsworth, 1974, Chapter 3.

¹⁷ McGuire, *Religion*, p. 244.

¹⁸ Guinness, *The Gravedigger File*, p. 75.

¹⁹ Guinness, *The Gravedigger File*, pp. 76-77.

²⁰ McGuire, *Religion*, p. 243.

²¹ Richard W. Garnett, 'A quiet faith? Taxes, Politics, and the privatization of Religion', www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/42_4/02_TXT.htm, p.1-11, p. 1.

²² Garnett, 'A quiet faith?', p. 2.

²³ Garnett, 'A quiet faith?' p. 9.

²⁴ Guinness, *The Gravedigger File*, pp. 76-86.

religion.²⁵ Dave Armstrong points out that Protestantism has a tendency to dichotomize everything, creating unnecessarily-polarized competition, leading to lack of unifying principle. He argues that such individualism in turn evolves into subjectivism and privatization.²⁶ This explanation is rather a self-reflection and remorse from within. In a more plausible sociological approach, Guinness relates privatization directly to modernization. While modernization brought a rapid change into society toward diversification, the churches were neither ready nor able to cope with this new situation. The Church, he continues, failed to provide new parishes to serve new populations in modern cities. As a result, Christian institutions and ideas were displaced from the center of modern society. In addition to this, the new society and its new reality required practical rationality. In more and more of public life, religion became practically irrelevant.²⁷

Then how did the privatization of Korean Christianity take place? Before discussing its (further) privatization, that Christianity was introduced to Korea in already privatized form should be kept in mind. From the beginning of the seventeenth century, Korean aristocratic scholars who visited China often returned with modern Western ideas as well as objects. Western ideas were regarded as an alternative science or ideology that could solve systematic problems that had accumulated in Joseon.²⁸ Soon scholars who were interested in the new sciences and critical toward the existing system formed the *seohakpa* or 'the school of Western Sciences'.²⁹ This *seohak* largely contributed to the late Joseon's academic trend of *shilhak*, or positivism.³⁰ Among these scholars who studied western civilization, there emerged a group of people who voluntarily started to practice Western religion, that is, Catholicism³¹ in the eighteenth century.³² This marked the beginning of the Catholic Church in Korea.³³ Catholics at that time were severely persecuted due to

²⁵ 'Religion and Public Life: A New Alliance?', www.georgetown.edu.centers/woodstock/report/r-fea65a.htm, pp. 1-8, p.2 and Dave Armstrong, 'Thoughts on the Historic Causes of Secularization', <http://ic.net/~crasmus/RAZ32.HTM>, pp. 3-4.

²⁶ Armstrong, 'Thoughts on the Historical Causes of Secularization', pp. 8-9.

²⁷ Guinness, *The Gravedigger File*, pp.59-63.

²⁸ Korea at that time. It can be spelled in various ways such as *Josun* or *Chosun*, I have followed the spelling as it appears in officially printed materials by Korean government.

²⁹ The translation of Korean word *hakmoon*, in short *hak*, cannot be fully expressed in English. It could be a science or an academic discipline. It is also used as verbal sense of learning or pursuit of learning. *Seohak* mean Western (*seo*) academy or science (*hak*). *Pa* means school.

³⁰ *Shilhak* literally means realistic science or practical science.

³¹ The distinction between Catholicism and Protestantism is only for the convenience of clear explanation. Christianity (*Kidokkyo*) and Church (*kyohwae*) generally designate Protestantism and Protestant Church in Korea while Catholicism and Catholic Cathedral have distinctive names of *Choenjookyo* and *sungdang*.

³² The Institute of Korean Church history Studies, *A History of Korean Church*, Vol. I, (Seoul: The Christian Literature Press, 1989), pp. 65-71.

³³ Since there was no Catholic priest in *Joseon*, the first Catholics organized a system of tentative priesthood. Later they found that this system was illegal in Catholicism and stopped practicing liturgies

their refusal of ancestral worship and due to the political power of their rivals. At one point Catholicism was banned, but Catholics persisted and became a powerful agent of social change.

The introduction of Protestantism to Korea in the late nineteenth century accelerated such social change. Since the foreign policy of Joseon was to close itself firmly against any foreign power, Protestantism also experienced hardships in its beginnings. But change of government as well as successive treaties with Japan and the US eased the way for missionaries and Christians.³⁴ The treaty between Korea and the US in 1882 gave rights for the latter to send 'scholars' into Korea for studying language, literature and the arts.³⁵ In 1884, an American missionary Robert Maclay obtained permission for missionary work in the education and medical sectors.³⁶ Since then, the influence of Christianity in those sectors have rendered it a real vehicle of modernization. Given the political situation, Korean Christianity and the Korean Church could not neglect the national problem and missionaries got involved politically both voluntarily and involuntarily.

However, as more and more people came to Church for political and social reasons, rather than for religious purposes, missionaries declared the principle of separation of Church and State in 1901, declaring that 'the Church cannot prevent Christians' individual participation in political movements, but the Church cannot be a direct arena for those movements'.³⁷ When some missionaries tended to support the Japanese colonial regime, Korean Christians criticized this support as the union of Church and State.³⁸ Japan's initial appeasement policies toward the Church and missionaries, including such things as governmental subsidy, were propaganda aimed at lessening anti-Japanese sentiments among educated Christians and at showing Japan's appreciation of the wider international society which explicitly allowed colonial rule.³⁹ However, these policies did not mean that the principle of separation of Church and State was discarded. Ito Hirobumi, the first Residency-General in Korea, suggested to a pro-Japanese missionary, M. C. Harris, that he should take up the tasks of spiritual enlightenment in Korea and church affairs while Hirobumi would take care of political affairs.⁴⁰ All in all, the history of Christianity in Korea, as suggested by the Institute of Korean Church History Studies, calls for a differentiation between a nationalist

and in 1789 sent one of their own to Father Raux in Beijing, China, to inform him about the situation and request missionaries. *A History of Korean Church*, pp. 74-76.

³⁴ These were unequal treaties. The treaty of 1876 with Japan in particular is regarded as the treaty in which Koreans sold their own country, laying stepping stones for Japanese colonial rule.

³⁵ *A History of Korean Church*, pp. 171-172.

³⁶ *A History of Korean Church*, p. 179.

³⁷ *A History of Korean Church*, p. 302.

³⁸ *A History of Korean Church*, pp. 302-305.

³⁹ *A History of Korean Church*, pp. 325-326.

⁴⁰ Lee Ik Kwan, *Stories of Korean Church History*, p. 210.

movement of Korean Christianity and a missionary-centered Korean Church.⁴¹

The colonial regime's successive persecution of Christians due to the latter's involvement in the Independence Movement had restored a rather estranged relation between missionaries and nationalistic Christians. Also, this persecution fueled national awareness and a spirit of resistance contrary to Japanese expectation.⁴² But a decisive blow, which led to the complete separation of Christianity and politics in Korea, came after the Samil (March 1) Independence Movement. This movement announced Independence on March 1, 1919, and thirty-three Korean 'national representatives' in Seoul, accompanied by hundreds of thousands of people on the streets, hailed 'Korean Independence' waving Korean flags they brought secretly. The nationwide movement lasted for sixty days, but it was eventually crushed and cost thousands of Korean lives. While sixteen out of thirty-three 'national representatives' were Christian, 17.6 percent of those arrested on March 1 were Christian, composing the biggest group categorized by religion.⁴³ In the midst of cries of 'Long live Korean Independence' during the Samil Independence Movement, eighty-eight churches perished along with 22,409 Christians.⁴⁴

The consequences of the Samil Independence Movement on the Korean Church, according to Lee Ik Kwan, was manifold: first, it encouraged nationalism and zeal for education; second, it resulted in the rapid growth of the Church owing to the desperate situation; third, Christianity became spiritually separated from real world politics; and fourth, freedom of press and publication, albeit in name only, was given by Japan's so-called 'cultural rule' policy in Korea.⁴⁵ Scholars of the Institute of Korean Church History Studies offer the analysis that on the one hand, the physical persecution brought about a quantitative damage and defunctness to the Church. On the other hand, parallel policies of appeasement and divide-and-rule resulted in a qualitative change and psychological damage.⁴⁶ In the twenties, the defeatism and nihilism which followed the Independence Movement resulted in a revival movement and mysticism, with an escapist eschatology and faith, which emphasized the next world. This established the trend of privatization. There was another trend calling for a national enlightenment movement to empower Korea at the same period of time.⁴⁷ But, this movement was also an

⁴¹ *A History of Korean Church*, p. 305.

⁴² *A History of Korean Church*, pp. 322-323.

⁴³ It should be noted that at that time, Christians were only 1.5% of the total population. *A History of Korean Church*, Vol. II, pp. 38-39.

⁴⁴ *A History of Korean Church*, Vol. II, p. 38.

⁴⁵ Lee Ik Kwan, *Stories of Korean Church History*, pp. 206-209.

⁴⁶ *A History of Korean Church*, Vol. II, p. 39.

⁴⁷ *A History of Korean Church*, Vol. II, p. 41.

indirect cultural movement leaving behind a political national quest, which is a sort of privatization of Christianity.⁴⁸

Once Christianity retreated to the private sphere, though unnoticed, reactions of Christianity to religious stimulations were fragmented. Christian participation in various Independence Movements was more individualistic in character despite the substantial size of its contribution. When Shinto, which is the worship of Japanese Emperor as the absolute god,⁴⁹ was imposed on the Korean churches in the thirties and forties, despite serious discussions and long resistance, all denominations in the end knelt down (on a denominational level). This defeat led to a serious degradation of Korean Christianity, which may not have occurred had the churches united and resisted together.⁵⁰ Lee Ik Kwan sees this defeat as an unforgivable sin committed by the Korean Church, leading to the latter's destruction.⁵¹ Korean Church history following this period is rather a history of division. This division largely originated from different positions on the Shinto issue.

Further, denominational divisions and sub-divisions helped the Korean Church become almost subterranean, existing in a private realm where public law could not reach most of the time. While the private sphere in the American sense means a realm where individual freedom and choice are respected and protected, the private sphere in the Korean sense indicates a realm where responsibility for action totally lies on the individual. Korean Christianity was privatized too early to create a healthy Christian culture. Revivalism became a movement whose goal is a local church's growth. Old *gibok*, that is blessing-expecting, faith was syncretized with Christianity and became a characteristic of Korean Christianity. Prayers became requests for earthly blessings. The fellowship of Christians was constricted to a local church members' social gathering.

The retreat of Korean Christianity and its influence from the public scene is related to the imbalance between females and males in the composition of the Church. In traditional Confucian society women's sphere was automatically equated with the private sphere. After the Samil Independence Movement, Korean male Christians ceased to be leading public agents of social change. Martyrdom became practically nonexistent following the divisions around the Shinto issue and the Korean war. The Church stopped challenging Christians – according to feminization theory, a lack of challenge drives male Christians away from

⁴⁸ We should note that there has always been tension between individual spirituality focusing Christianity and social evangelism movement.

⁴⁹ Shintoism was uninstitutionalized worship of natural phenomena, mythical characters, historical heroes and spirits of ancestors. Later in the late nineteenth century it was manipulated to oppose Christianity through theologizing the divinity of the royal family and institutionalization by government. Lee Ik Kwan, *Stories of Korean Church History*, pp. 284-285, 350-352.

⁵⁰ *A History of Korean Church*, Vol.II p. 301. Of course, numerous martyrs in this period should not be neglected. Without their sacrifice, the Korean Church would not exist.

⁵¹ Lee Ik Kwan, *Stories of Korean Church History*, pp. 296-297.

the Church.⁵² Thus, the Korean Church gradually became a realm dominated by females. As the majority of Korean women were not employed until a few decades ago, these women were more reachable and had more time to attend church meetings. They were and are still over-educated for their position in the Church. This induced a vicious circle in which the over-educated women make men feel inferior, and in turn, the latter are disaffected and leave the Church, which leads to the Church having to educate more women than men. Fewer male Christians naturally led to less social influence by Korean Christianity despite the large number of female Christians.

Another factor that pulls men away from the Church is its strict ban on drinking and smoking. This was introduced by missionaries in the early twentieth century because of the known seriousness of their negative effects on social and familial dimensions as well as health. To be baptized one must first refrain from drinking and smoking. In 1927, a Christian conference held in Hwangjoo launched a movement called 'Drinking Evil Conquering March' aiming at prohibition of drinking and smoking.⁵³ It was certainly influenced by the Eighteenth Amendment in 1919 which made alcohol illegal in America.⁵⁴ Soon conversion to Christianity was and is usually equated with abstinence from drinking and smoking. Another important aspect concerning feminization of Korean Christianity is the concept of 'commitment' and 'ministry'. Choi Young Gi explains this that as traditional church does not give opportunities to minister without graduation from a seminary, ministry is supposed to be only for pastors and evangelists, or would-be pastors. It would appear, then, that for those who love the Lord and want to serve him more, there is no other possibility than go to a seminary.⁵⁵ By comparison, there are numerous areas where possibilities exist for lay ministry and service for women. Lee Jae Chol reports that he experienced difficulty in the beginning when he started the cell group Bible study. He appointed men as leaders of each cell and women as managers. However, cell group Bible study was considered to be mainly for women and men failed to take on an active role. He concludes that it was a total failure.⁵⁶ In most Korean churches, as in Western churches, women outnumber men in the pews while leading ministers are mainly men. And also as in many Western churches, the number of 'normal' young men remains small⁵⁷ in the Korean Church.

⁵² David Murrow, *Why Men Hate Going to Church*, (Nashville, Tennessee: Thomas Nelson, Inc., 2005), pp. 18-22.

⁵³ Lee Ik Kwan, *Stories of Korean Church History*, pp. 410-411.

⁵⁴ Murrow, *Why Men Hate Going to Church*, p. 62.

⁵⁵ Choi Young Gi, *Kajung kyohwero sewojineun pyungshindo mokwhoe* (Lay ministry based on house churches), (Seoul: Duranno, 1999), p. 192.

⁵⁶ Lee Jae Chul, *Whebok-ut mokwhoe* (Ministry of restoration), (Seoul: Hongsungsa, 1999), p. 50.

⁵⁷ Leon J. Podles, *The Church Impotent, The Feminization of Christianity*, (Dallas: Spence Publishing Company, 1999), pp. ix-xi.

Leon Podles traces the origin of the feminization of Church from twelfth century, with its bridal mysticism, women's movement, and Scholasticism which concerned heart and emotion.⁵⁸ He contends that feminization originated from bridal mysticism with individualism since the only real concern of Christianity becomes 'Jesus and me'. Feminized Christianity uses affection words, stresses on relationships and feelings, and produces universalism from the notion of loving God. It distorts Christianity as emphasizing receptivity and obedience.⁵⁹ It also often distorts women as being more religious than men.⁶⁰

A large part of feminization theory, though not its origin in the twelfth century, is applicable to the Korean Church. As religion had no place in politics or business, men relegated it to the home and to the woman's sphere of responsibility. As Church is privatized or/and individuated, it is more likely to be feminized (not necessarily only in numbers), and in turn the more feminized, the more privatized.⁶¹ Indeed, Christianity was and still is playing an important role for Korean women. It provided them formal and informal education, helped their emancipation, and further became a field in which they could attain social autonomy and empowerment⁶² though only within the Church boundaries. Kelley Hong's research found that one of the most latent institutional functions of Korean churches is as an extra-domestic, female-centered community that serves as a crucial source of female autonomy. And women's church involvement is explained as a response to a set of two distinct and conflicting feminine desires: one, to resist the oppressions of the patriarchal family; and two, to preserve its integrity.⁶³ Women's submission is a kind of strategy especially for negotiating domestic relations. Many women, according to Hong, initially embrace submission because they see it as an important means of reforming the behavior of others, especially the husband. (1 Peter 3.1-2) But a strategy of perfect submission also becomes a weapon of internal resistance by enabling women to feel a sense of moral superiority. Church fulfils a crucial emotional need in their lives.⁶⁴ The blessing-oriented message preached in the Korean Church today is not unrelated to the latter's feminization.

The Korean Church's contribution to women's social status in general as well as women's contribution to the Church as a huge human resource pool should be appreciated. But at the same time the need for a gender-balanced proportion of Christians within the Church and the restoration of balance between outreach and fellowship activities should not be

⁵⁸ Podles, *The Church Impotent*, pp. 102, 110.

⁵⁹ Podles, *The Church Impotent*, pp. 113-138.

⁶⁰ Murrow, *Why Men Hate Going to Church*, p. 8; see also Janet Wootton, *This is our Story: the Ministry of Women in the Free Churches*, (Peterborough, UK: Epworth, 2007), p. 87-88.

⁶¹ Podles, *The Church Impotent*, p. 29.

⁶² Kelley Hong, 'Agony in Prosperity. Conversion and the Negotiation of Patriarchy among South Korean Evangelical Women', *Harvard Divinity Bulletin*, Summer 2004, pp. 11-15, p. 13.

⁶³ Hong, 'Agony in Prosperity', p. 15.

⁶⁴ Hong, 'Agony in Prosperity', pp. 12-14.

overlooked. Stories of exemplary and successful churches testify to the importance of this balance. Moreover, it should be noted that there is a relationship between privatization, feminization of the Church and universalism. Feminization of the Church is easier when the Church is in the private sphere. Universalism is pluralism in other words and is a product of feminization since the latter stresses the 'loving God' who cannot forsake non-Christians. Without awareness, the Korean Church is apt to be further trapped by the privatization of religion and enervated as it sees the challenges as separate phenomena arising from different causes.

Os Guinness presents secularization, privatization, and pluralization as three phenomena which the modern Church faces. He describes secularization as the acid rain of the spirit, the atmospheric cancer of the mind and the imagination.⁶⁵ Privatization means that the grand global umbrella of faith has shrunk to the size of a plastic rain hat.⁶⁶ And pluralization sees to it that there is no sacred canopy, only millions of small tents; no global umbrella, only a bewildering range of pocket umbrellas for those who care to have one.⁶⁷

The Demand for Democracy in the Church

The bitterest criticism of the Korean Church falls on its power-oriented character justified by the logic of church growth as well as materialism. Han Young Sang, an elder and retired journalist, points out that the reason for the adoption of growth first policy by churches is to magnify their own power, authority and the honor of their leaders through establishing a powerful church organization, not solely to expand the Kingdom of God and serve him. This directly leads to materialism and justifies business-like strategies in the Church.⁶⁸ Also while in pursuit of a mega-church, the church becomes an idol and the pastor, a 'little God'.⁶⁹ This trend produces a local church-centered exclusivism. Being faithful to a local church is regarded as being faithful to God.

But at a closer look, such a church phenomenon in Korea is a reflection of the authoritarianism embedded within Korean culture. Professor Kim Kyung Il claims, in his sensational book *Should Confucius die, the Nation lives*, that Confucianism, which is the basis of Korean culture, has destructive powers. And he points out that Korea is the most Confucian

⁶⁵ Guinness, *The Gravedigger File*, p. 60. Though men keep practicing religions, institutionalized or uninstitutionalized, the idea of secularization has obviously undermined the position of Christianity.

⁶⁶ Guinness, *The Gravedigger File*, p. 79.

⁶⁷ Guinness, *The Gravedigger File*, p. 94.

⁶⁸ Han Young Sang, *Should the Church die, Jesus Lives*, p. 181.

⁶⁹ Han Young Sang, *Should the Church die, Jesus Lives*, p. 191.

of the three Asian countries of China, Japan and Korea.⁷⁰ Moralism in Confucianism produces a vicious circle: a call for morality; the establishment of a supra-legal power to eliminate the wrong past; the destruction of normal government; the removal of the roles of professional groups; the silencing of any objective alarm systems; the corrosion of professional systems in various social sectors; a breakdown of society by external shock or internal confusion; then a call for morality to resolve the problem.⁷¹ It is this very supra-legal power that is able to eliminate errors in the past and drive for development but ends as a blockage to a law-governed society and corruption of power. Also, power in Confucianism is a dualistic concept which flows through a one-way vertical route.⁷² A leader's position in the Church is thus understood in the language of altitude: 'higher' than the laity's. Rev. Kim Dong Ho also notes that Korean culture in which one's role decides status inevitably brings about a misconception of the roles of pastors and elders in the Church.⁷³ The authority of one who teaches within a Confucianist culture produces not only respect but a vertical power relationship. The relationship between men and women is also vertical. A pastor rules, teaches, and is most of the time a man. Women's service in a local Korean church in many cases consists of support-level tasks, laboring under the image of helpers or service-workers as portraits in the image of 'caring and sacrificing mother'. Kelley Hong reports women's complaints of being treated by their churches as merely a 'herd of kitchen slaves' forced to perform the same tasks in the church as they do at home like cleaning and cooking.⁷⁴ These vertical power relationships combine to make the church a power-centered organization. This power center in the church is not necessarily restricted to the pastor, but expands to a session of presbyters following the same logic. As Kim Dong Ho describes it, a Korean church becomes either a 'pastor's church' in which its pastor has absolute leadership or an 'elders' church'.⁷⁵ He also points out that when a church is in its nascent stage, a session sets the agenda and makes the decisions on most church affairs, while the session's own members, that is, the presbyters, carry out those decisions. But after the church grows, presbyters tend to remain decision-making and executors, and this usually alienates other church members while forming an unnecessary power hierarchy.⁷⁶ Distorted relationships within the Korean Church as aforementioned is a result of Korea's cultural weakness unconsciously carried out within a church which could not create a new Christian

⁷⁰ Kim Kyung Il, *Kongjuga juguya naraga sanda* (Should Confucius die, the Nation Lives), (Seoul: Bada Publication, 1999), p. 11 of Electronic Book.

⁷¹ Kim Kyung Il, *Should Confucius die*, p. 19.

⁷² Kim Kyung Il, *Should Confucius die*, p. 19.

⁷³ Kim Dong Ho, *Saengsareul gim kyowhoe gaehyuk* (A Church Reformation at the Risk of a Life), (Seoul: Kyujang Moonwhasa, 1999), p. 17.

⁷⁴ Hong, 'Agony in Prosperity', p. 13.

⁷⁵ Kim Dong Ho, *A Church Reformation*, p.37.

⁷⁶ Kim Dong Ho, *A Church Reformation*, p.20.

culture, rather than an intended manipulation by an immoral church or its leaders. It is noteworthy that this lack of accountability of power and its possible misuse are left and neglected because they are considered as matters of the private sphere.

The system in which important decisions are made by only a few particular people is, as Max Weber explained, a general problem any organization faces as its scale and size grow.⁷⁷ Church as an organization run by humankind, cannot be an exception. Kim Sung Gun also explains problems found in the Korean Church today as problems accompanying the amplification of its organization.⁷⁸ While Korean society is getting more and more democratic, the Korean Church does not cope with democratization, let alone lead it, making itself anachronistic. Rev. Lee Jae Chul also points out that any human organization loses its vitality once it is organized and gets farther from its original spirit and purposes. And this is the reason why continuous self-examination and self-retrospection is required to any given organization including the Christian Church.⁷⁹

A call for a self-purifying reformation to the Korean Church is voiced by both Christians and non-Christians alike. Related criticism and calls for democratization within the Church mainly target the abovementioned authoritarianism. In addition to Korean society's democratization and its consequent request in the Church, the recognition and realization of the fact that church leaders are often under-qualified to have such absolute authority in contrast to generally well-educated laities (due to general high standard of education in Korea) has contributed to the call for democracy within the Korean Church. A 2005 census shows that during the last decade the number of Catholics increased from 6.6 percent to 10.9 percent of the Korean population while Protestants decreased from 19.7 percent to 18.8 percent. A striking report was that 57.1 percent of converts to Catholicism came from Protestantism and 62.2 percent of non-religious people, who once had a religion but do not now are ex-Protestant.⁸⁰ The reasons for their leaving Protestantism are over-exaggerated pietism, an emphasis on offering, and under-qualified pastors.⁸¹ The trend of a general lack of higher education among Korean pastors dates back to the 'Mission Rules and By-Laws' which is commonly referred to as the 'Nevius Policy' named after a missionary. It was arranged by missionaries in Korea to help establish 'independent, self-reliant, and

⁷⁷ Kim Sung Gun, 'How do we have to see *seseup* discourse? Why it happens more frequently in Methodist churches?' <http://blog.naver.com/joshua21/90006993179>

⁷⁸ Kim Sung Gun, 'How do we have to see *seseup* discourse?'

⁷⁹ Lee Jae Chul, *Ministry of Restoration*, p.16. Despite often dictator-like pastors, the biggest reason for the Korean Church's rapid growth, according to Kim Dong Ho, is because pastors had pure faith and passion. Kim Dong Ho, *A Church Reformation*, p.97.

⁸⁰ Chung Sook Hee, 'Katolikwa gaesinkyo' (Catholicism and Protestantism), *Daily Hankuk Ilbo*, Friday, July 21, 2006, A13.

⁸¹ Chung Sook Hee, 'Catholicism and Protestantism'.

aggressive native churches' in 1891.⁸² In spite of its great contribution to Korean Christianity, this policy hindered by means of regulating the education of Korean ministers by limiting the level of a minister's education to that of general Koreans.⁸³ As a result, Han asserts that revivalists with Bible School level of education instead of ones equipped with profound theology were produced.⁸⁴

Many Korean churches are passing through a period of democratization within their churches. Rev. Kim Dong Ho, however, warns that there is a misunderstanding of democratization by confusing the 'priesthood of all believers' with 'pastorship of all believers'. He claims that we need to clarify and distinguish the roles of pastor and elders.⁸⁵ He also strongly suggests the priority of the Word over administration implying democratization within church should be limited to the administrative level, not to the extent that they interpret the Word democratically.⁸⁶

One point that deserves our undivided attention lies in how church-planting in Korea generally happens. Usually a pastor initiates a local church-planting. In this process, oftentimes church property is rented or purchased under the name of the pastor since the body of the church is not yet sufficiently constituted to be given a legal name. This leaves a source of possible dispute over church property which is often criticized as 'privatization of church (as a property)' in common terms. If a church grows based on its pastor's charisma, it naturally becomes a pastor-centered church. And if a pastor is relatively democratic, it is prone to become a presbyter-centered church after initial growth, due to the cultural reasons discussed above. Hence, the underlying system of the church determines the characteristics of what it produces.

The success of the Gamjatang Church (Potato Broth Church - often regarded as an ideal model of church)⁸⁷ is not merely because of the pastor's rightly-oriented ministerial philosophy and its realization, but also because the church was planted by its pastor in accordance to his vision from the beginning. In the case of an already organized church, however, as seen in the writing of Rev. Kim Dong Ho, such a change or reformation within church seems so difficult that he describes it as 'a church reformation at the risk of a life'.⁸⁸ The difference in the extent of

⁸² *A history of Korean Church*, Vol. I, p. 219.

⁸³ *A history of Korean Church*, Vol. I, pp. 218-225.

⁸⁴ Han Young Sang, *Should the Church die, Jesus Lives*, p. 108.

⁸⁵ Kim Dong Ho, *A Church Reformation*, pp. 17, 72-73.

⁸⁶ Kim Dong Ho, *A Church Reformation*, pp. 133-134.

⁸⁷ The church's real name is Kwang Yeom Church which means 'Light and Salt Church'. It is known as Potato Broth Church due to the church's physical location within a building which has a potato broth restaurant with a big sign board, compared to the church's. Members of the church naturally started using the name of the potato broth restaurant to direct people. Yang Byung Moo, *Gamjatang Kyowhoe iyagi* (A story of Gamjatang Church), (Seoul: Kimyoungsa, 2004), p. 20.

⁸⁸ Kim Dong Ho, *A Church Reformation*. The book presents the problems of the Korean Church and calls for reformation. He calls the reformation risky not only because of his church's resistance to change

success between the two churches is mainly due to the fact that one involved the consolidation of planting church, while the other, the reformation of a planted church. It owes much less to the pastor's vision. A pastor who initiates church planting, leads the way to its growth and leaves that church when it reaches high growth, as in the case of Lee Jae Chul, is a rare case.⁸⁹ The Korean Church is in dire need of a changed system which does not block the church's democratization.

The Emergence of a born-Christian Generation

In order to talk about Korean Christian culture, we have to note that there are Koreans who are born into Christian families and naturally become Christians. There is bound to be a born-Christian generation after more than a hundred-years presence of Protestantism in Korea - in the case of Catholicism more than two hundred years. Nevertheless, the Church's attention to this generation often remains superficial mainly concerning their abandonment of Christianity. The born-Christian is referred as one with *motae sinang*, which literally means faith from the mother's womb.⁹⁰ Also a born-Christian is not necessarily always a born-again-Christian (John 3.3). The Catholic Church calls one who was once Catholic or born to a Catholic family and calls oneself Catholic but who no longer attend the mass any more a *naengdamja*, or cold-hearted one or resting believer. The number of nominal Christians is reportedly increasing.⁹¹ Korean churches in the United States reports that eighty five per percent of the second generation Koreans leaves the Church.⁹²

Online chats related to *motae sinang* show that born-Christians are in need of special attention. Debate is most frequently on whether one possessing *motae sinang* is saved or not. And the issue appears on a quite regular basis. Participants in these Internet debates frequently show their rejection of the attitude of those with *motae sinang* who take their salvation for granted. Detailed soteriology is not within the scope of this research. Nonetheless, these chats usually conclude that even a born-Christian without a personal encounter with God and transformation is a practitioner of religion or nominal Christian. A claim for a birth without original sin is also observed.⁹³

but more because of the general trend within Korean Christianity. His church adopted many changes one by one and with time success was achieved, though not at the level Kim had hoped for.

⁸⁹ His story from the planting of Lord Church to his resignation after ten years of successful ministry is well documented in his book *Ministry of Restoration*.

⁹⁰ A born-Christian says, 'I am *motae sinang*' rather than 'I have a *motae sinang*'. A second or more generation Christian should be more precisely called *motae sinangin* or *motae sinangja*, but casually called *motae sinang*.

⁹¹ <http://news.media.daum.net/culture/others/200608>, *Daily Mail Economy*.

⁹² www.JAMAnewawakening.com.

⁹³ Internet ID nochili, on Jan. 2, 2006 http://kin.naver.com/db/detail.php?dclid=6&dir_id=60301&eid=QCL2Do7Y4wU34CIUNPGpUcgoJXP/ghDC&qb=uPDFwr3FvtM=.

Some criticize that Christian parents' imposition of their own beliefs, especially those of the mothers, on their children is a form of deprivation of the children's right to choose.⁹⁴ One of the participants asserts that imposing parents' beliefs on children is a kind of brainwashing quoting Richard Dawkins.⁹⁵ One says that possessing a *motae sinang* can be a source of pride but is not something to show off.⁹⁶ Many admit that it must be a great blessing,⁹⁷ which allows a child to naturally receive a Christian education which would make one a believer without difficulty.⁹⁸ A born-Christian expresses his/her complicated feeling of being grateful and burdened at the same time.⁹⁹ Thus the general image of those with *motae sinang* is divided into two categories: one as a Christian who is not so pious but steady, the other one as a Christian who practices Christianity both formally and as a daily routine. Interestingly, converted Christians and born-Christians envy each other. The former envy the latter for their Christian environment and educational opportunities as Christians. One even attributes his/her unhappy and painstaking life to his birth to a non-Christian family.¹⁰⁰ On the other hand, born Christians envy the dramatic experience of their counterparts.¹⁰¹ Chung Sung Min notes a general pattern of gradual conversion among most of the *motae sinang*. Born-Christians, according to Chung, while attending Church services and meetings, 'feel' as if they have been saved and easily assume they have become children of God. They are accustomed to thinking about salvation positively. However, once they realize their lack of special spiritual experiences and their confidence in salvation is shaken, they are filled with sudden anxiety. Some of these born-Christians envy converted Christians for the latter's spiritual experiences while others continue to question whether those with *motae sinang* receive the Holy Spirit or not.¹⁰² Contrasting born-Christians' need of guidance in their identity, ministers' interest concerning these Christians is generally limited to the fact that they also need to meet the Lord personally and to what the shortcomings of *motae sinang* are and what damage they could bring to the Church as bad examples if they become nominal or show immature

⁹⁴ Internet ID you_r_wrong, on June 7, 2006 http://kin.naver.com/db/detail.php?d1id=6&dir_id=60301&eid=eENWLMuXYNnpPny3qg8ZnZN2ellBaFmP&qb=uPDFwr3FvtM=.

⁹⁵ Chat on Nov. 6, 2005 <http://fonac.net/it/tag%B8%F0%CS%C2%BD%CS%BE%D3>.

⁹⁶ Internet ID antimega2k on April 16, 2006 http://kin.naver.com/db/detail.php?d1id=6&dir_id=60301&cid=1loPkGC2EnjIHBf08FfStUkR7FP+3GOM&qb=uPDFwr3FvtM=.

⁹⁷ Internet ID lovejh0313 on March 18, 2003 and others. http://kin.naver.com/db/detail.php?d1id=6&dir_id=60301&eid=d1OeiuRpH7CwYEyP/qNa98loZw9daCxR&qb=uPDFwr3FvtM=.

⁹⁸ Internet ID anatomy77, on Jan. 2, 2006 http://kin.naver.com/db/detail.php?d1id=6&dir_id=60301&eid=QCL2Do7Y4wU34CIUNPGpUcgoJXP/ghDC&qb=uPDFwr3FvtM=.

⁹⁹ Internet ID chlojs on Aug. 5, 2004 http://kin.naver.com/db/detail.php?d1id=6&dir_id=603&eid=f1uPiXJ25hxKKy9fdIBp8j0eojLHCMh6&qb=uPDFwr3FvtM=.

¹⁰⁰ http://www.sfkorean.com/srv/let/IMBoard?tablename=brd_religion&mode=view&boardpage=7&searchscope=&category=&no=2443.

¹⁰¹ <http://blog.naver.com/Img927?Redirect=Log&logNo=100003174890>.

¹⁰² Chung Sung Min, 'What is salvation?', <http://lw.kehc.org/files/200607/htm/632302.htm>.

faith and lives. They think the concept of *motae sinang* is not Biblical and therefore should not be used.¹⁰³

But a special sociological focus on this *motae sinang* generation is required. This born-Christian issue is directly related to the absence of a Christian culture in Korea. While frequent criticism of and also self-reflection on the Korean Church is about discrepancy between faith and daily life, the dualistic lives led by Christians is considered as one of the main reasons which distract people including born-Christians from the Church and take away the trust of society.¹⁰⁴ Rev. Kim Dong Ho, in his analysis of the problems of the Korean Church, asserts that this discrepancy stems from a misconception of ministry. Christians often think that only the ministry is a sacred profession while all other jobs are just tools for gaining financial income and not necessarily for carrying out the work given by God. So, Christians' attitudes toward their professions become secularized and so does the manner in which they work, that is, in a worldly way, far from God's way. The overall result is the incongruence between faith and daily life.¹⁰⁵ Christians whose faith is alienated from their daily lives cannot serve as role models for either non-Christians or those of *motae sinang*. In turn, a Christian culture cannot be formulated. Furthermore, without a shared Christian group culture faith remains only in the hands of individuals, that is the privatization of Christianity. Oh Kang Nam further points out that Christians have two faiths: one for external usage to show other Christians and the other for their own application. This division hinders faith from maturation.¹⁰⁶ It seeps into language and gives rise to a kind of situational code switching among Korean Christians.¹⁰⁷ American Christian journalists also reportedly adopt a personal language policy to differentiate between their professional language and their religious one.¹⁰⁸

Unfortunately the conclusions from within the Church for the most part do not go beyond calls for becoming better Christians, as they fail to examine the social dimensions of religion. A culture can be explained as a value (or belief) system which members 'share'. Guinness stresses that a belief that seems convicting is directly related to its 'plausibility

¹⁰³ Rev. Choi Kwang Ook, on July, 16, 2006. <http://www.kbcwt.com/pcolumn.php?action=viewwind&topicid=62&PHPSESSID=da829d47c178d8114c642401721004a3>; <http://www.kbcwt.com/pcolumn.php?action=viewwind&topicid=19&PHPSESSID=e6b9eee704a06cc65258b66e8f3770fd> and Rev. Choi Young Gi on Aug. 14, 2004. http://www.seoulbaptist.org/bbs/zboard.php?id=column&page=1&sn1=&divpage=1&sn=off&ss=on&sc=on&select_arrange=hit&desc=desc&no=129.

¹⁰⁴ Daily *Hankuk Ilbo*, Tuesday, June 27, 2006, A17.

¹⁰⁵ Kim Dong Ho, *A Church Reformation*, pp. 55-56.

¹⁰⁶ Oh Kang Nam, *Yesumeun upda* (There is no Jesus), (Seoul: Hyunamsa, 2005), p. 48. He explains that this originates from different denominational dogmas and describes its consequential narrowness.

¹⁰⁷ See Lee Sung Ock, 'Korean Mission', in *International Congregational Journal*, 5.1 Fall 2005, p. 84.

¹⁰⁸ John Schmalzbauer, 'Between Professional and Religious Worlds: Catholics and Evangelicals in American Journalism', *Sociology of Religion*, Winter, 1999, www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0SOR/is_4_60/ai_59199507/print.

structure', that is the group or community which provides the social and psychological support for the belief.¹⁰⁹ In other words, when, and only when a belief is shared and supported by members can this belief appear plausible and credible. Applying this concept to Christianity, when the Church is consistently and continuously strong, Christianity will seem true. But when Church is weak Christianity will seem less true.¹¹⁰ Privatized and further individualized Korean Christianity means that its plausibility structure is weak because belief is not shared. Struggling *motae sinang*-based Christians are fragmented individuals who need to belong. The loss of born-Christians in the Korean Church is not a personal or familial problem which can be solved by appealing the to individual pietism of parents and children. It is a failure of Korean Christianity in group formation, let alone group identity building due to privatization.

Exceptions in which privatization of religion does not occur despite modernization are found when a religious identity is strongly inter-related to a group's national or ethnic identity. But Korean Christianity retreated to the private sphere after the Samil Independence Movement and further demoralization and defeatism by Shintoism reinforced its privatization. Denominational divisions after this period meant the absence of a collective memory of Korean Christians as a group, which is the pivotal element of group identity building. In the process the Korean Church sank into the private sphere to the extent that it no longer even formed a subculture within Korean society, while a secular Korean nationalism gained a dominating position in competing with other forms of collective identity. And so Korean national identity became a force of modernity.¹¹¹

In this context, where Korean Christianity is being increasingly penetrated by worldly values, Chung Heung Ho is right in his evaluation that the problem of Korean Christianity today is not how the church could be separated from the world, but a very ontological one of how worldly factors destroy the uniqueness of the Church.¹¹²

Conclusion

Returning to the issue of *sescup*, the self-reflection and remorse of Korean churches and Christians were timely efforts. And their initiatives to eliminate secularity from the Church and to create a healthy Christian culture such as *kiyoonsil*, the Christian Ethic Movement, to set up a

¹⁰⁹ Guinness, *The Gravedigger File*, p. 35.

¹¹⁰ Guinness, *The Gravedigger File*, p. 144.

¹¹¹ Shin Gi Wook, *Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy*, (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), pp. 10-14.

¹¹² Chung Heung Ho, 'Culture and Contextualization', in Kang Seung Sam et al. *Cultural Anthropology for Mission and Witness*, (Seoul: Jireh Publication, 2001), p. 287.

regulation prohibiting the practice of *seseup* in Church Law,¹¹³ should be appreciated. Korean society's criticism of the Korean Church and Christianity following the sequence of these events shows that Korean society expects the Church to be its source of ethical guidance. As Liliane Voye observes, even in a society with advanced modernity there are areas such as ethics and identity where religion should be a voice to society.¹¹⁴

But more importantly the *seseup* event shows that the system within the Korean Church and not only personal morality should be analyzed carefully. It mirrors the overarching problems of Korean Christianity. The *seseup* event happened in a private sphere away from government and society. Because the Church is located in the private sphere, the privatization of church property could be contemplated. Because the Church is in the private sphere, it could be undemocratic. Because the Church is in the totally individualized private sphere, born-Christians cannot find a place to belong.

If the Korean Church today is privatized and further individualized, this should be overcome through genuine fellowship. If born-Christian generations are not always born-again, the Gospel should reach out to them. Evangelism and fellowship, aren't these the *raison d'être* of 'Church'?

¹¹³ <http://www.darakwen.net/news/NewsView.asp?LCODE=10&MCODE=12&TCODE=11&SEQ=865> and www.darakwen.net/news/NewsView.asp?LCODE=10&MCODE=12&TCODE=1&SEQ=870.

¹¹⁴ Liliane Voye, 'Secularization in a Context of Advanced Modernity', *Sociology of Religion*, Fall 1999, www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_moSOR/is_3_60/ai_57533382/print.

